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Recent Developments 
Brown v. State: 
Spousal Privilege Allows for the Confidentiality of Marital Communications by 
Bestowing a Privilege, Waivable Upon the Spouse Making the Communication 
I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that section 9-105 
of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
("section 9-1 05") does not render 
one spouse incompetent to testify 
against the other spouse. Brown v. 
State, 359 Md. 180, 753 A.2d 84 
(2000). Instead, the court held that 
section 9-105 merely bestows a 
privilege upon the spouse making 
the communication that is 
exercisable and may be waived by 
the same spouse. The court 
grounded its holding on the basic 
principles of statutory construction. 
On September 10, 1995, Keith 
Brown ("Brown") allegedly 
murdered his mistress, Makea 
Stewart. During petitioner's trial 
for the murder, his wife, Ms. 
Brown, testified during the state's 
case-in-chief that Brown had 
confessed to her that he had killed 
Ms. Stewart. After the completion 
of her testimony, Brown's attorney 
objected to the testimony based 
upon section 9-105, arguing that the 
testimony given by Ms. Brown was 
inadmissible because it was a 
confidential communication 
between husband and wife. 
The trial judge originally ruled 
in favor of the defense, but later 
reconsidered its ruling in light of 
By Christopher Mason 
Harris v. State, 37 Md. App. 180, 
376 A. 2d 1144 (1977), where the 
court of special appeals held that 
section 9-105 did not apply when 
the confidential communication 
constituted a threat or crime against 
the other spouse. The trial judge 
held that Brown's 'my spouse did 
it' defense, raised at different times 
throughout the trial, put Ms. Brown 
at risk, and thus, precluded Brown 
from invoking section 9-105. The 
judge concluded that, although 
section 9-105 is a competency 
statute, it would be unfair to 
disallow Ms. Brown an opportunity 
to reply to the accusations raised 
by her husband, which is exactly 
what the exclusionary provision of 
section 9-105 would do. 
Consequently, Ms. Brown's 
testimony was deemed admissible 
and, as a result, Brown was a 
convicted of first-degree murder 
and various handgun offenses. 
The Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland affirmed the 
convictions in an unreported 
opinion. The court held that section 
9-105 is a privilege statute, not a 
competency statute, and this 
privilege is waived when a 'my 
spouse did it' defense is raised. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari to determine the 
following: (i) whether section 9-105 
is a privilege status or a competency 
statute; (ii) if, in fact, it is a 
privilege statute, can that privilege 
be waived; and (iii) if the privilege 
is waived in the case at bar. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by looking to the principles 
of statutory construction. Brown v. 
State, 359 Md. 180, 188,753 A.2d 
84, 88 (2000). The court concluded 
that its primary objective was to 
ascertain the Legislature's intent in 
enacting, and periodically 
amending, the statute. !d. 
Ordinarily, if the language of the 
statute is clear and unambiguous, 
then the analysis will end at this 
point. !d. However, the court 
stated that if a literal reading is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the 
legislative intent, the court can look 
beyond that literal meaning, and 
"may consider the consequences 
resulting from one meaning rather 
then another, and adopt the 
construction which avoids an 
illogical or unreasonable result, or 
one which is consistent with 
common sense." !d. at 189, 753 
A.2d at 88 (quoting Tucker v. 
Fireman s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 
69, 75,517 A.2d 730,732 (1986)). 
In discerning the intent of the 
legislature, the court of appeals 
determined that section 9-105 
"cannot be considered in 
isolation," and looked to the 
general rule set forth in section 9-
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 53 
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101 of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article of the 
Annotated Code for guidance. !d. 
at 189, 753 A.2d at 89. 
Additionally, the court opined that 
it is sometimes "necessary to look 
at the development of a statute ... " 
to assess the legislature's intent. !d. 
(quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md. 
481, 492, 632 A.2d 753, 758 
(1993)). 
Reviewing the history of 
section 9-105, the court found that 
the Maryland General Assembly 
established a spousal privilege by 
enacting a statute in 1964 that 
prohibited one spouse from giving 
evidence for or against the other 
spouse in a criminal proceeding, 
and forbade the disclosure of 
marital communications in any 
proceeding, civil or criminal. !d. 
at 195, 753 A.2d at 92. Repealed 
by the legislature in 1876 for 
ancillary reasons, the court of 
appeals, believing this retraction 
was inadvertent, still followed the 
provisions as a result of their 
common law roots. !d. at 196, 753 
A.2d at 92 (citing Turpin v. State, 
55 Md. 462 (1881)). 
Following the lead of the state 
judiciary, the legislature reinstated 
the spousal testimony privilege in 
1888. !d. at 196, 753 A.2d at 93. 
As a result of the 1888 amendment,· 
the law in Maryland was that: 
1) spouses were generally 
competent and compellable 
witnesses; 2) in criminal 
proceedings, the spouse of 
the defendant was 
competent to testify, but 3) 
in no case, civil or criminal, 
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 54 
shall any husband or wife 
be competent to disclose 
any confidential 
communication made by the 
one to the other during the 
mamage. 
!d. at 197, 753 A.2d at 93. 
This language, along with the 
provision that a person could not 
be compelled to give adverse 
testimony in a criminal proceeding 
involving the person's spouse 
followed the legislature's intent by 
enacting section 9-105 ofthe Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article in 
1973. 
After a thorough analysis of 
section 9-105, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that section 9-1 05 
does not necessarily render one 
spouse incompetent to testify 
against the other spouse. !d. at 202, 
753 A.2d at 96. Rather, the court 
held the statute created a privilege 
that allows the communicating 
spouse to prevent testimony by the 
other spouse that would reveal that 
confidential communication, but the 
confidential communication may be 
waived by the spouse who asserted 
the spousal communication. !d. 
The court did note, however, 
that due to the "solid public policy 
underpinnings" of this privilege 
there can be no waiver of the 
privilege except in the clearest of 
circumstances. !d. at 203, 753 A.2d 
at 96. These circumstances include 
(i) the failure to object, and (ii) 
voluntary self-disclosure of the 
conversation. !d. at 206, 753 A.2d 
at 98. Since Brown's "my spouse 
did it" defense did not encompass 
either of these two circumstances, 
the court concluded that the 
privilege was not waived. !d. 
Consequently, it reversed Brown's 
convictions and remanded the case 
for a new trial. Id at 206-7, 753 
A.2d at 98. 
Although Brown v. State will 
most likely lead to more evidentiary 
hearings regarding communications 
between spouses in order to 
determine if the communication was 
confidential and therefore 
inadmissible, the court properly 
balanced the sanctity of marriage 
and the need for confidentiality to 
promote trust and harmony between 
spouses. While a competency 
finding would have resulted in a 
bright line rule, under which 
spouses could never testify under 
any circumstances, the current 
privilege finding allows for a 
possible waiver and the 
admissibility of the resulting 
testimony. 
